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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM

c.

HOYLE et al,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
CASE NO. 16133
16134

-vsDAVID s. MONSON, Lietenant
Governor-Secretary of
State,
Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment (the
actions being consolidated) to hold §20-3-14, 1

Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 unconstitutional and to require the Defendant to place their names on the

ballot for Congress

as independent candidates since plaintiffs were impecunious and the statute requires payment of a filing fee
which cannot be waived by Defendant.

1.

"Any candidate filing a nomination paper or acceptance
···· . shall pay to the filing officer a fee for such
filing.
The fee to be paid shall be one-fourth of one
percent of the total salary for the full term legally or
customarily paid by such office •.... but such fee shall
not be less than $5.00, except filing for all present
offices shall be $1.00.
"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court held that §20-3-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, violated Article I, Section 4 of thE.
2
c onst1tut1on,
.
.
an d ordered that plaintiffs-appellanb

Utah
n~~

be printed on the ballot as independent candidates fcc.·
Congress.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant requests this Court to
reverse the decision of the District Court and to declare §20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, constitutional in
view of the provisions of §20-7-20, 3

Utah Code Annotated

1953, as applied to these plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-Appellants are in all respects
qualified to be independent candidates for election to
the House of Representatives except that they did not
pay filing fees at the time of filing nominating petitions with the Secretary of State.

Mr. Hoyle had

borrowed funds which were deposited with the Clerk of
the Court pending decision of this case by agreement of
counsel.

Mr. Bangerter was unable to borrow any money·

It was stipulated that each candidate was impecunious.

2.
3.

. ed of afi:
shall be reqmr d .0
" •...•. No property q ualification
.
.
vide
i
person to vote, or hold office, except as pro
this constitution."
. .
the na~'
" •.... The voter may also insert in writing.'· .. "
of any person for whom he desires to vote .. ·•·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

ARGU!·1ENT
POINT

I

THAT SINCE THE UTAH ELECTION LAW, ( §20-7-20,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, PROVIDES THAT
WRITE IN VOTES ARE COUNTED WITHOUT PAYMENT
OF ANY FEE BY A CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE OR HIS
SUPPORTERS, THE UTAH REQUIREMENT OF THE PAYMENT OF A FILING FEE BY A CANDIDATE WHO
WISHES TO HAVE HIS NAME PRINTED ON THE
BALLOT (§20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953)
DOES NOT VIOLAIE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
It is clear that §20-3-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, requires the payment of a filing fee by a candidate
for puolic off ice who wishes ·to have his name placed on
the ballot.
State has no

It is equally

clear that the Secretary of

statutory power to waive the requirement in

any case, including cases in which a candidate is wholly
without funds to pay the required fee, or who
"impecunious", however the term may be defined.

may be
Under our

state law, however, write-in votes are allowed and are
counted without any requirement of payment of a fee by
the person whose name is written in, by his supporters or
by tne voter,

4.

(§20-7-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

Amendment XIV
" ..... No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of ~itizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without_du~ p7ocess
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdi.ction
the equal protection of the laws."
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Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
94 S.Ct. 1315, decided by

709,

39 L.Ed. 2d. 702 ,

the Supreme Court of the United

States on March 26, 1974, states as a federal constitutional
requirement that while a state may properly impose a requirement that a candidate for public office pay a reasonable filing fee, i t must provide for a reasonable alternative means of ballot access by a serious indigent candidate,
otherwise there would be a denial of equal protection of
the law required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Cali-

fornia law held to be unconstitutional had no way whatever for the candidate to get on the ballot without payrnent of a fee,

If a write-in vote was to be counted, the

candidate had to file a statement at least eight days prior
to election and pay a filing fee,

39 L.Ed.2d, 702, 705.

405, U.S. 134, 31 L.Ed.2d~l,!
I
the Court had previously held the Texas

In Bullock v. Carter,
92 S.Ct. 849

(1971)

law unconstitutional since payment of a high filing fee
was the only way a candidate could gain a position on a
party ticket.

The Court held that the statutory alterna-

tive of filing a petition with the proper number of signatures without payment of a fee which would place the name
nab le
of the candidate on the final ballot, was not a reaso
· d te would
alternative to the fee payment since the can d 1 a

not run as the candidate of his chosen party, and ~at in
be more cruc ,:,_
some parts of Texas the primary election may
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than the general election.

1

These two eases represent what the Supreme Court
of the United States has determined as the standards permitted with respect to filing fees-the fee must be reasonable-there must be ballot access for a serious but indigent
candidate.
In this case, the concurring opinion in Lubin,
by Justice

Blackmun, in which Justice Rehnquist joined,

is particularly important.
procedure, free of fee,

" •.. I would regard a write-in

as an acceptable alternative.

Prior

to 1968 California allowed this ...... But the prior fee requirement for the write-in candidate was incorporated into
the State's Election Code in that year.

...•.• it is that

addition, by amendment, that serves to deny the petitioner
the equal protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

II

39 L.Ed.2d. 702, 712.

It is submitted that there are many state interests served by keeping a ballot within manageable proportions, and these interests are recognized in the opinions
cited.

In the case at bar the candidates sought to run as

independent candidates,
in Bullock

The party ;restrictions referred to

are not therefore applicable.

The Lubin de-

cision seems to imply that the California fee (which is
apparently based on 2% of salary and is therefore more than
the Utah fee) is not unreasonable in itself, since the petitioner was indigent and could pay no fee whatever, the
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
Institute ofpayment
Museum and Library
issue is
open.
What
is Funding
clear
is provided
onlyby the
that
ofServices
a
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fee may not be

the exclusive method of ballot access.

In the absence of a definitive ruling, the writein provisions of the Utah law must be deemed a 1 egally and

!

constitutionally permissible alternative.
POINT II
THAT SECTION 20-3-14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED /
1953, BY REQUIRING A CANDIDATE TO PAY A
FILING FEE DOES NOT IMPOSE A PROPERTY
QUALIFICATION UPON A CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION
4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
An examination of the Official Report of the Pro-

ceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention (Star
Printing Co. 1898) shows that the major portion of the debates dealing with voter qualification dealt with woman's
sufferage.

By the time that our Constitution was adopted,

and as reflected in the Enabling Act, universal adult male
sufferage was already achieved and apparently taken for
granted.

The only things respecting the property qualifi-

cations for holding office or voting were respectively
whether the statement that no property qualifications for
office or voting belonged in Section 4 of Article I and,
as demonstrated in the final choice of phrase in Section

4

and in Section 7 of Article IVS as adopted, which restricted
voters to tax paying property owners in elections levying
special taxes.

The thinking of the members eemed to be

that if a tax were to :Oe levied, those who owned propertY ..
' g a S~'
S. ArticleIV, Section 7.
"Except in elections.~~vy~~onsba:·
tax or creating indebtedness, no property q~al1 11 ica
required for any person to vote or hold office.
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i

upon whic!1 the tax was to be levied should decide whether
or not a special tax purpose was worth the expenditure they
were called upon to pay.
The source of the filing fee paid upon filing
is not now, nor has it ever been a material item in determining a candidate's qualification.

6

If a candidate has

any real support it would appear that the supporters could
contriirnte the funds, and in fact this is one of the purposes of the fee-elimination of non-serious candidates.
There is no state requirement that a candidate
for office own either real or personal property, nor i.Eh
there any requirement that he file a

financial statement,

or do anything else to disclose his wealth or lack thereof
to the public.
It requires only a general knowledge of American
history to ascertain the reasons for constitutional provisions such as Article I,S§ction 4.

The American people

found out several hundred years ago t~at we do well to prevent any aristocracy from looking to our best interest
whether this group is established on roal blood lines, or
some principle of theology, or on possession of money, or
property.
6

"igualified" means.possessed of certain qualities o~ caga cities,
app v. Post Printing, 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 98 ,9~ ,
" ..... a qualified voter ... is .. a qualified elector who has
met the additional requirement ..... of payment of all taxes
assessed against him .... " Watson v. Sportenborg County Bd.
~~_.:._ 141 S.C. 347, 139 S.E. 755.

1
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5

"""

It is not reasonable to believe that our Legislature would seek to pass an election law establishing
weal th as. a basic requirement for office in view of our
political history as English Colonies.

It may

be argued

that the effect of the law is to exclude a poor man from
running for office, but i t would be equally reasonable to
conclude that the effect is to limit the ballot to serious
candidates who have some realistic chance of election or
at least to those who may have an impact on the public or
upon other candidates to influence the position taken on
one or more current political issues.
No test, particularly a property test has been
imposed in violation of Article I, Section 4. 7
The vast majority of states have upheld the impositi on of reasonable filing fees against many cons ti tuional
challenges.

(See. Annotation 89, A.L.R.2d 864).

The reasons

for up!1olding the legality of the fees have been set out in
Lubin v. Panish and in Bullock v. Carter.

The United States

Supreme Court has recognized in both of these decisions that
a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number
of candidates on its ballots, in

preventing the clogging

of its election machinery, in avoiding voter confusion, and
assuring that the office holder elected is the choi~ ~a
majority or a strong plurality of the voters.
7.

Tygeson v. Magna l·Jater Co., 119 U.274, 226 P2d 1 27 ·
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It is respectfully submitted that the District
Court misconstrued the purpose of our Constitutional provision of prohibiting a property or religious test for
office.
CONCLUSION
While ballot access must be afforded in some
manner to an indigent candidate and
a ballot only to those persons who

a state may not limit
pay a filing fee with

their own funds or with funds provided by their supporters,
a state has a right and a duty

to

protect its ballot.

The means chosen by the State to achieve such
protection, so

long as the means are reasonable, are con-

stitutional when a reasonable alternative, such as our
write-in provisions, are available to a serious indigent
candidate who seeks to run as an independent as did plaintiffs here.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

